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Introduction To The IALS Conference on
Comparative Constitutional Law*
Louis Del Duca, Patrick Del Duca and Gianluca
Gentili**
Transplant of legal concepts from one constitutional system to
another necessarily raises the question of transformation of those
concepts and consequently the further questions of hybridization and
perhaps convergence of legal systems. In the new context, with its
unique politics, history, and culture-legal and otherwise, the transplant
may, in ways determined by its host environment, thrive, wither or
transform itself. A transformed transplant may work differently, serving
distinct ends, or replicate its original model. It may induce legal systems
to converge or to evolve in continued independent ways.
The thirteen essays here contributed speak to the potential benefits
and the phenomenon of transformation, as well as the
transplant
of
prospects of convergence, in distinct and diverse voices. The legal
systems considered include those of Canada, France, India, Italy,
Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey and the United States. They range
across common and civil law systems and along a broad spectrum of
In the illustration of
developed and emerging market economies.
transplants and their ramifications, the authors address areas of scholarly

legal inquiry such as judicial review, constitutionalism, human rights,
* Papers presented in this symposium are based on presentations made by the
authors at the International Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional
Law held September 11-12, 2009 in Washington, DC and hosted by American University
Washington College of Law and Georgetown University Law Center.
** Louis F. Del Duca, Edward N. Polisher, Distinguished Faculty Scholar, The
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University; B.A. Temple University;
J.D. Harvard Law School; laurea in giurisprudenza,UniversitA di Roma. Patrick Del
Duca, adjunct professor, UCLA Law School; Partner, Zuber & Taillieu LLP; JD Harvard
Law School; laurea in giurisprudenza,UniversitA di Bologna; Ph.D European University
Institute; DEA Universitd de Lyon II, Facult6 de Sciences Economiques. He is the author
of CHOOSING THE LANGUAGE OF TRANSNATIONAL DEALS: PRACTICALITIES, POLICY AND
Gianluca Gentili, laurea in
LAw REFORM (American Bar Association 2010).
giurisprudenza, UniversitA di Firenze; Master of Arts in Public Economic Law,
UniversitA di Pisa; LL.M., The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University; doctoral candidate in Comparative Public Law, Universit. di Siena, Italy.
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intersectionality, and legal education. The authors probe historical and
contemporary developments to address current challenges that include:
(i) providing water in South Africa to sustain human dignity in an
impoverished community, (ii) the implications of allowing or prohibiting
the wearing of a veil in the context of public education in France and
Turkey (and more broadly relative to Canada, the interfaces of women's
rights, the observance of cultural and religious traditions, and family
law), (iii) the establishment of judicial review in a post-conflict
environment (drawing on Italy's post World War II experience), (iv) the
transformation of European civil law systems, as well as that of the
European Union itself, by virtue of their exposure to the European
Union's common law jurisdictions (notably the law of England and
Wales), (v) the revolution in English law associated with the injection of
European Community and European human rights components into it,
(vi) the role of constitutional anchors in India for state intervention to lift
significant portions of society from poverty, and (vii) attention to foreign
constitutional models in the systems of legal education in Malaysia and
South Africa as well as in South Africa's vibrant constitutional
jurisprudence.
From the multiplicity and heterogeneity of subject matters in highly
diverse legal systems and societies, emerges a clear value in the conduct
of investigations of transplants and convergence, as well as the impact of
hybridization in generating social change. Such investigations enrich the
understanding of constitutional issues within and across systems and
empower those who seek social change with a more profound
understanding of the array of instruments, their advantages and their
limitations, that are available to carry it forward. The Conference and
Symposium in this context address seven basic themes: (i) comparative
constitutional law (methodology, hybridization, transplants);
(ii) religion, State and constitution; (iii) gender and constitution;
(iv) constitutional adjudication and democracy; (v) distributive
justice; (vi) contemporary challenges to executive power; and
(vii) legal education.
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: METHODOLOGY,
HYBRIDIZATION, TRANSPLANTS

Methodological Challenges in Comparative ConstitutionalLaw
Vicki Jackson
Hybridization: A Study in Comparative ConstitutionalLaw
John McEldowney
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Introduction of JudicialReview in Italy--Transitionfrom Decentralized
to CentralizedReview (1948-1956)-A Successful Transplant Case
Study
Louis F. Del Duca

Vicki Jackson, a leading scholar of comparative constitutional law
methodology, opens this selection of articles by addressing
Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law. She
identifies general goals of comparative legal studies and notes the special
way in which they apply to the unique challenges of comparative
constitutional law.
Prof. Jackson identifies four main goals of comparative study of
legal systems: (i) understanding other systems; (ii) developing better
understanding of one's own system; (iii) identifying "best practices" and,
(iv) further exploring domestic doctrinal or textual questions. As she
notes, seeking to achieve each of these goals presents characteristic
challenges. For example, acquiring sufficient fluency in another legal
system may require committing time and effort that might be invested in
direct, deeper understanding of one's own legal system. Moreover, it
may be quite difficult to appreciate in a founded way the nature of
differences and the reasons that give rise to them.
Prof. Jackson is clear: a correct methodological approach is of
primary relevance in any legal study. However, its importance increases
when legal comparisons are involved in order to avoid focusing on easy
and misleading analogies (or differences) and to further studies of
cultural and social backgrounds along with legal materials.
Methodological issues are even more important in a young field like
comparative constitutional law. 1 The field has emerged from the
1. Currently, two leading United States casebooks address comparative
constitutional law: Vicki Jackson, Mark Tushnet (eds.), COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2nd ed. 2006, first ed. 1999); Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, Andras Saj6,
Susanne Baer, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003). A

work from outside the United States is Aalt Willem Heringa, Philipp Kiiver,
CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(2009). One of the first casebooks for comparative constitutional law published in the
United States was Mauro Cappelletti, William Cohen, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW. CASES AND MATERIALS (1979). See also Vicki Jackson, Mark Tushnet (eds.),
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2002), with a foreword by

the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist. To address
the absence of comparative and transnational law components in conventional law school
teaching materials in the United States, one publisher has come to market with a GLOBAL
ISSUES SERIES to supplement such materials. The series includes GLOBAL ISSUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW by Brian Landsberg and Leslie Jackobs, as well as volumes on
civil procedure, contracts, copyright, corporate law, criminal law, employee benefits,
employment, employment discrimination, environmental law, family law, freedom of
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discipline of comparative law, originally focused on comparisons of the
While comparisons among
private law of various jurisdictions.
fundamental documents (constitutions) date back to Aristotle, only with
the development and spreading of written constitutions has the study of
this subject gained momentum and its own scientific independence. 2
Although the United States Constitution, at least from the 1803 decision
of Marbury v. Madison,3 has contemplated judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws, and Hans Kelsen's conceptualization of a
mechanism for centralized constitutional review in a civil law legal
system was first implemented in post World War I Austria, only
following World War II did constitutions widely assume the rigidity
associated with their use as a criterion of reference for judicial review of
laws, thus creating the conditions for emergence of the new discipline.
The discipline came of age in the 1980s and 1990s, under the influence
and, after
of significant constitutional changes in Canada, South Africa
• 4
fall of the Berlin Wall, several central European countries.
Prof. Jackson identifies three challenges that are unique to
comparative constitutional law relative to other comparative legal
studies:
(i) the historical contextual foundation of constitutional
provisions; (ii) the tendency in constitutional law and theory to conflate
descriptive and normative assertions (that is, to mix "what is" with "what
should be"); and (iii) the aspirational (what Prof. Jackson references as
"identitarian" or "expressivist" and others might understand as
"nation/national identity-building") aspects of constitutional law (for
example, inclusion of the invocation of the Holy Trinity in the preamble
of the constitution of Ireland, or inclusion in the preamble of the
constitution of Iraq, the identification of "the people" as those originating
from "the land between the two rivers"). Prof. Jackson's analysis
teaches: (i) a need for sensitivity to how functions that appear similar,
may in fact be different in different societies; (ii) an attention to how
seemingly separate institutions or legal practices can be actually
connected to and influenced by others; and, (iii) an openness to

speech and religion, income taxation, intellectual property, legal ethics, property, torts
and trademarks.
2. On development of comparative constitutional law, see Mark Tushnet,
Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, in Mathias Reimann, Reinhard Zimmerman (eds.), THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATivE LAW 1226 et seq. (2006).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. Id. at 1127 et seq. Here Prof. Tushnet identifies three events that provoked
affirmation of comparative constitutional studies: "patriation" of Canada's Constitution;
South Africa's democracy-building and constitution-drafting processes of the 1990s
leading to its 1993 and 1996 constitutions; and the extensive revisions of Eastern
European constitutions after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with support of the Council of
Europe's (Venice) Commission for Democracy through Law.
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perceiving how "expressivist" components of a constitution can
influence legal rules and doctrines.
In his article on Hybridization: A Study in Comparative
Constitutional Law, John McEldowney analyses a special form of
convergence between different legal systems, defined as Hybridization.
This process furthers a migration and transposition of ideas and concepts
between legal systems, rejecting a mutually exclusive approach that
would result in substitution of one system for another. The process
endorses common sharing and mutual influence, while safeguarding
national sovereignty and identity. Introducing his analysis with an
overview of the historical foundations of hybridization processes, Prof.
McEldowney underlines the origins in the field of private law of
convergence among legal systems. The processes of hybridization,
however, are now no longer limited to the area of private law, but are
also significantly at work in the areas of administrative and constitutional
law, contributing, for example, to the establishment of a new European
administrative law and determining constitutional consequences
especially relative to the role of courts.
And indeed, Prof. McEldowney identifies hybridization dynamics in
a current European trend that he maintains has led to a new legal
tradition in Europe. This tradition finds its roots in the convergence
between the two well known Western legal traditions: common law and
civil law.
The European Union is presented therefore as one
paradigmatic example of hybridization, in which processes of transplants
and convergence have nonetheless been able to preserve elements of
national sovereignty within domestic legal systems. Together with
current developments in the field of human rights protection, the Treaty
of Lisbon simultaneously represents both a visible outcome and a
foundational element of this new process. In the Treaty, harmonization
of the twenty-seven Member States' diverse legal systems in areas
relevant to the Union is pursued with consideration to mutual influence
and harmonization on the one hand, and preservation of national
constitutional and cultural elements on the other.
Moving away from the European landscape, Prof. McEldowney
identifies the Japanese legal system as presenting another example of the
dynamics of hybridization. Since the early medieval period, Japan has
experienced at least three periods (the medieval-Tokugawa period, the
Meiji era and the post-World War II period) of adaptation to foreign
influences. While these influences have deeply affected the Japanese
legal system, they also show that adaptation to foreign influences may be
achieved while retaining national cultural and societal attitudes.
In the final part of the article Prof. McEldowney draws some
conclusions addressing concerns about how hybridization may ultimately
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change the dynamics of how legal systems adapt to changes while
striving to preserve their own essential characteristics.
Louis F. Del Duca in his article on Introduction of Judicial Review
in Italy-Transition from Decentralized to Centralized Review (19481956)-A Successful Transplant Case Study charts how Italian courts
initially reacted to the judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. He
provides a detailed account of the reaction of the legal system as a whole
and, more specifically, of sitting judges to the establishment of a system
of judicial review. In the 1948 to 1956 period between the adoption of
the Italian constitution and the commencement of functioning of the
Italian Constitutional Court, the Constitution granted ordinary and
administrative judges the power of judicial review of the constitutionality
of laws.5 The judicial decisions of this period that he discusses illustrate
the political and ethical sensitivities confronted by sitting judges, as well
as the challenges of cultural transition, in a post-conflict environment.
Along with other European countries following the end of World
War II, Italy adopted a new constitution. Its drafters intended that it
safeguard against the abuses of power and the horrors that had occurred.
One of the innovations of the new constitution was the introduction of
the concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws into the
Italian legal system.
Together with the entrenchment of civil, political and social rights
in a "rigid" constitution, i.e. amendable only through a procedure
requiring supermajorities, the constitution's framers saw a key guarantee
of the Constitution as being the establishment of a system of judicial
review that would defend the newly enacted Constitution against acts of
the legislator inconsistent with the rights rooted in the Constitution. The
design of the Italian system of judicial review, like that of other
constitutions introducing such review into civil law systems, draws
heavily from the so-called centralized model of judicial review
developed by Hans Kelsen for the 1919 Czech Constitution and
introduced also in the 1920 Austrian Constitution.6

5. Disputes between private parties are handled by the so called "ordinary" courts
in Italy and in civil law countries generally. Disputes between private parties and the
State are handled by the "administrative" courts in Italy and in other civil law countries
that follow the inspiration of French administrative law. For a discussion of the
"ordinary" courts and "administrative" courts in Italy, see Louis Del Duca, Patrick Del
Duca, An Italian Federalism?-TheStates, its Institutions and National Culture as Rule
of Law Guarantor,54 Am. J. COMP. L. 799, 835 et seq. For a recent discussion of the
Italian system of constitutional justice, see Tania Groppi The Constitutional Court of
Italy: Towards a Multilevel System of ConstitutionalReview?, 2 J. OF COMPARATIVE LAW
100 (2008).
6. Fundamental in comparative study of systems of judicial review was Mauro
Cappelletti, JUDiCiAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971).
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The Italian Constitutional Court was contemplated by the 1948
Constitution and established in 1956. Prof. Del Duca's paper explores
elements of the re-invention of the Italian state in the transition period
between the adoption of the constitution and the commencement of
functioning of the Constitutional Court that the constitution
contemplated. This period of re-invention and re-definition of the Italian
state following the end of World War II charted a course of respect for
the rule of law that continues to prevail in Italy today.
Prof. Del Duca's work lays out the politically challenging cases that
arose during the 1948-1956 transition period from efforts to use the
justice system to resolve charges of misconduct and collaboration with
the fascist regime during the period of the war. As the Italian courts
experimented with their approach to the constitutionally-granted new
power of judicial review, they demonstrated sensitivity to either
upholding or countermanding acts of the non-elected transitional
government on constitutional grounds, preferring in key instances to rely
on other tools of statutory interpretation to resolve the cases presented to
them. The launch of the Constitutional Court in 1956 overcame any
diffidence of Italian courts to judicial review of the constitutionality of
laws and was the moment in which the innovative principles established
by the 1948 constitution received full endorsement and application.
From its very first decision in 1956, the Italian Constitutional Court, as a
freshly established institution directly legitimated by the constitution,
determined the "peremptory" status of the civil rights' provisions of the
constitution and their direct applicability without further implementation,
rejecting the view that they had a merely "programmatic" nature. It
thereby began its continuing and flourishing role as a voice, without
ambiguity, of the central position of constitutional review of laws in the
Italian legal system.
RELIGION, STATE AND CONSTITUTION

Secularism, The Veil and "ReasonableInterlocutors": Why FranceIs
Not That Wrong"
Guy Haarscher
The Protectionof Laicism in Turkey and the Turkish Constitutional
Court: The Example of the Prohibitionon the Use of the Islamic
Veil in HigherEducation
Mehmet Cengiz Uzun

Guy Haarscher and Mehmet Cengiz Uzun in their respective
essays on France and Turkey, Secularism, The Veil and "Reasonable
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Interlocutors": Why France Is Not That Wrong and The Protection of
Laicism in Turkey and the Turkish ConstitutionalCourt: The Example of
the Prohibition on the Use of the Islamic Veil in Higher Education"
consider the issues raised by the wearing of a veil in educational
contexts. Both France and Turkey posit themselves as lay states.
However, whereas Turkey historically defined itself as a lay state as part
of separating the state from Islam, France's experience of Islam arises
from a growing Islamic community not present in the period of France's
initial address of the issues of church and state. In each country, the
debate waged through high court decisions, legislation and electoral
contests reflects concerns over the present and future nature of society,
related to perceived tensions between the current exercise of individual
freedoms and the maintenance of a society in which such freedoms are
sustained.
Each of Prof. Haarscher's and Mehmet Cengiz Uzun's works
emphasizes the significance of the special features of a school setting in
the determination of whether display of a religious symbol should be
allowed or banned. In the educational setting, they explore the special
prominence to be afforded to the values of academic freedom, the
educational process and the development by students of an autonomous
perspective on religion.
In addressing the controversy over the wearing of the veil in
secondary education, Guy Haarscher provides a comparative overview
of developments in France and Belgium, while analyzing the rhetoric
employed in the public discourse over the veil. This discourse has
involved participation by "reasonable" and "unreasonable" interlocutors,
defined in Prof. Haarscher's view by whether they embrace respect for
human rights and popular sovereignty and posit themselves within the
Prof. Haarscher views
framework of a liberal-democratic State.
arguments by "unreasonable" interlocutors (whether for or against use of
the veil) as simply incompatible with what has been defined as
"reasonable pluralism.",7 However, he finds it increasingly difficult to
identify which interlocutors fall within his "unreasonable" classification.
He observes that the employment of new dialectic techniques and
appearances of more nuanced approaches often disguise fundamentalist
views, further obscured by deliberate attempts to confuse the audience
through use of sophisms. In such efforts, new terminology is carefully
chosen to participate in the general discourse, and old references to
"race" are substituted by the term "culture," while the content of the
message remains unchanged. Instead of speaking of unequal "races,"

7. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
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such interlocutors now speak of different "cultures" that, while perhaps
enjoying the same dignity, should nonetheless be kept separated.
Prof. Haarscher traces the veil controversy in France back to 1989,
when a group of girls attending a public secondary school refused to
remove the veil, the wearing of which they saw not as a religious
imposition, but rather as an exercise of religious freedom. The incident
raised the question of whether veil should be considered as an
individual's right or as an intrusion into a domain of the State, to wit a
public school. The French Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), invoked to
issue an opinion on the compatibility of wearing the veil in a public
school with the principle of laicism guaranteed by the 1958 French
Constitution, 8 determined that wearing the veil could not by itself be
considered to violate the principle of laicism, but instead qualified as an
exercise of freedom of religion. 9 However, the Council cautioned that if
"supplemental elements" 10 were present, school principals would be
entitled to ban use of the veil. Prof. Haarscher compares this perspective
with the contemporary, but different approach adopted in Belgium,
where public school directors have had, even absent "supplementary
elements," full discretion to decide whether to allow or prohibit the veil
in school settings. There, in almost all cases, the directors had banned it.
Fifteen years following the Council of State's advisory opinion,
France further drew from the Belgian experience to adopt a law
providing uniform national treatment of the issue. In France, support for
use of the veil became increasingly radical, making it difficult to separate
the "supplementary elements" from unconditional exercise of religious
freedom. Accordingly, the approach of case-by-case decisions had
become unmanageable. In March 2004, France therefore adopted a
statute prohibiting overt religious signs at school."l According to Prof.
Haarscher, the two countries reached the same conclusion, albeit by
different routes. The growing presence of fundamentalism rendered
inappropriate to allow wearing of the veil in secondary schools, where
attending students remained vulnerable by virtue of their youth. In each
country, the conclusion was that to allow the wearing of the veil by
students in secondary education would constitute an unreasonable
accommodation.
8. Art. 1, 1958 FRENCH CoNs-r.: "France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic
and social Republic."
9. Council of State, Interior section, Advisory Opinion no. 346893 of November
27, 1989 on Wearing of the Islamic Scarf.
10. The Council of State opinion identifies examples of "supplemental elements"
such as pressures on girls to force them to wear the veil in the nature of provocation,
proselytizing, propaganda, acts against the dignity or freedom of the student, and breach
of school order.
11. Law no. 228/2004 of March 15, 2004.
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The article concludes by addressing the notion of "reasonable
accomodation," a notion increasingly applied in multicultural societies to
12
accomodate and protect cultural, religious and ethnic diversity.
According to Prof. Haarscher, accommodation of religion in public
schools can be considered reasonable only when the inconveniences
generated by the positive "intrusion" of religion in the secular neutral
public sphere are balanced by benefits in terms of religious freedom and
tolerance. Problems arise, however, when accommodation becomes the
means for "unreasonable" interlocutors to "conquer" the secular public
sphere. According to Prof. Haarscher, reasonable accommodation
therefore should be pursued only when respect for democratic values is
guaranteed and prioritized. He asserts that the "slippery slope" argument
here rightly applies. 13 He, however, would leave open the possibility of
allowing the wearing of the veil in educational environments if a more
favorable context would evolve, one in which the principles established
by the Council of State could be applied to so allow.
Mehmet Cengiz Uzun focuses on two decisions of the Turkish
Constitutional Court issued in June 2008. On June 5, 2008 the Court

12. In regard to accommodation of diversity, Canada presents the example of
valuing multiculturalism and committing itself to preservation of an "ethnic mosaic." In
the educational setting, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision Multani v. Commission
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 is often cited as paradigmatic
example of "reasonable accomodation" of religious diversity. The Court there declared
unconstitutional a Quebec school authority order imposing a total ban on carrying
weapons at school when applied to a Sikh boy's wearing of a traditional religious knife
(kirpan). The Court determined that the total ban violated the freedom of religion
protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the
violation was not justifiable under Section 1 of the Charter. It therefore struck down the
ban as unconstitutional. Reasonable accommodation has some times been qualified as a
duty, especially with regard to recognition of religious holidays by employers. See Josd
Woehrling, L 'obligationd'accommodement raisonnableet I 'adaptationde la socigt 6 la
diversitg religieuse [The duty of reasonable accommodation and the adaptation of society
to religious diversity], 43 McGILL L.J. 325 (1998). The Supreme Court of Canada
imposed a duty of accommodation of religious diversity on employers in Ontario Human
Rights Commission v. Simpson Sears Ltd. [1985] 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.C.C.); Central
Alberta Diary Pool v. Alberta Human Rights Commission [1990], 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417
(S.C.C.); and Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 95 D.L.R. (4th)
577 (C.C.C.).
13. "'Slippery slope' arguments claim that endorsing some premise, doing some
action or adopting some policy will lead to some definite outcome that is generally
judged to be wrong or bad. The 'slope' is 'slippery' because there are claimed to be no
plausible halting points between the initial commitment to a premise, action or policy and
the resultant bad outcome. The desire to avoid such projected future consequences
provides adequate reasons for not taking the first step." Walter Wright, Historical
Analogies, Slippery Slopes and the Questions of Euthanasia, 28 J. OF LAW, MEDICINE
AND ETHics 176 (2000).
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issued its judgment14 on the constitutionality of a constitutional
15
amendment (Law no. 5735/2008, known as the "turban amendment")
intended to lift the existing ban on the wearing by women of the Islamic
veil in higher education settings. Expressly vested by the constitution
with the power to judge the constitutionality of constitutional
amendments, 16 the Constitutional Court struck down the turban
amendment as violating the principle of laicism established through
several provisions of Turkey's Constitution.17 A few weeks later, on
June 30, 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court addressed the request
that the long-established political party "Justice and Development"
(AKP), that through popular election had become the ruling party, be
dissolved on ground of an alleged violation of the principle of laicism.'
The violation was asserted to arise from the AKP's introduction into the
Parliament of the turban amendment. Although the Court found that
actions of the AKP had indeed violated the principle of laicism, the
Court lacked the necessary majority of seven of its eleven judges
required to dissolve the party. Instead, it ordered the most stringent
measure short of dissolution, namely the interruption of all state financial
support. The Court in its decision cited the 2005 European Court of
Human Rights' judgment in the Case of Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, in which
the Strasbourg Court had found that a ban on headscarves in universities
did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights as it was

14. Judgment of June 5, 2008, E: 2008/16, K: 2008/116, Constitutional Court of
Turkey.
15. Law no. 5735 of February 9, 2008.
16. Article 148 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution provides "[c]onstitutional
amendments shall be examined and verified [by the Court] only with regard to their
form:" This therefore excludes review of the substance and content of the amendment.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never addressed the constitutional
legitimacy of a constitutional amendment, other courts around the world have found
Notable examples are the
constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional.
Constitutional Court of Germany (the 1951 Southwest States Case), India (1967 Golak
Nath case and the 1973 Kesavandanda Bharati v. State of Kerala decision) and Taiwan
(Judicial Interpretation no. 499 of March 24, 2000). The Italian Constitutional Court
declared the unconstitutionality of a constitutional law (enjoying the same status of the
constitution in the hierarchy of the sources of law, even if not directly modifying the text
of the Italian constitution) in decision no. 1146 of December 29, 1988.
17. More specifically, determined by the content of the preamble together with
articles 2 (Turkey as a democratic, laic, social state governed by the rule of law), 10
(equality before the law), 14 (Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms), 24 (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), 174 (laic character of the
Republic) and with specific regard to the educational setting here at issue, article 42
(Right and Duty of Training and Education).
18. Judgment of June 30, 2008, E: 2008/1, K: 2008/2, Constitutional Court of
Turkey. The Court has jurisdiction over these requests under article 101 of Law No.
2820 on Political Parties.
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"required, especially in Turkey, to protect the rights of those who do not
wear the headscarf." 19
The two decisions represent the starting point for Mehmet Cengiz
Uzun to analyze, from historical, constitutional and cultural perspectives,
the development and current status of the protection of laicism in
Turkey. 20 According to Uzun, the Turkish principle of laicism finds its
roots in the French doctrine of "la'cisme," requiring abstention from any
religious influence in the public sphere and translating into a ban of
public display of religious symbols, be they artifacts or clothing,
especially in educational settings. 21 Building on the original French
conception, this principle has however found an original application in
Turkey where the state is called to play a role in regulating religious
affairs. The article describes the tension arising in Turkey in connection
with balancing the interests at stake, namely the right of any individual to
enjoy the so-called forum externum of the freedom of religion and the
right of a third party not to be exposed to abusive proselytism. In
analyzing in detail the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
turban amendment and the decision of Constitutional Court declaring its
unconstitutionality, it focuses on the illustration of the fundamental
position of the principle of laicism in Turkish constitutional law, with
specific reference to the use of the Islamic veil in higher education.
In this regard, Uzun charts the history of legislative enactments and
judicial counter-actions taken concerning this ban and devotes specific
attention to the recent events surrounding the so called "turban
amendment," qualified by the Constitutional Court as an attempt to
modify provisions in the Constitution safeguarding the principle of
laicism and bypass the Court's "constant jurisprudence" on point.22 The
article also addresses the theological approach that the Constitutional
Court has employed in the interpretation, protection and enforcement of
the principle of laicism. In Uzun's view, this approach derives from the
intent to pursue, since the foundation of the Republic, the
"institutionalization of the state according to the rules of reason and
19. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, [GC] App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005).
20. Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Grand Chamber, [GC] App. No. 44774/98 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005)
21. The European Court of Human Rights has recently addressed this issue in its
decision Affaire Lautsie c. Italie (App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H. R.(2009)) in which the
Court found display of the crucifix in Italian classrooms in violation of article 2 of the
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (right to education) and Article 9 of the abovementioned Convention (freedom
of thought, conscience and religion).
22. In 1989 that the Court had declared for the first time that the use of the Islamic
veil in higher education was irreconcilable with the principle of laicism: Judgment of
March 7, 1989, E: 1989/1, K: 1989/12, Constitutional Court of Turkey.

2010]

INTRODUCTION

science. 2 3 Uzun's detailed analysis represents therefore a primary
reference for all those countries where analogous issues are increasingly
debated, and an interesting case study of possible legal and political
implications of such a ban.
GENDER AND CONSTITUTION

Is ConstitutionalismBadfor IntersectionalFeminists?
Beverley Baines

Is ConstitutionalismBad for Intersectional Feminists? This is the
challenging question Beverley Baines asks in her article and that guides
her analysis and assessment of the collective significance of so-called
"intersectional feminists."
The constitutionalism that Prof. Baines
references in the title of the article is broadly the classic rule of law
tradition that holds the State accountable for its actions and entrenches
citizens' fundamental rights in a rigid constitution. However, her
analysis is also rooted specifically in recent developments in the
Canadian constitutional landscape. In 1982 Canada supplemented its
first constitution, the British North American Act, with the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That Charter is a bill of rights enjoying
constitutional status 24 that, among other rights, expressly codified
protection and enhancement of multiculturalism. 25 Canada recognizes
itself for its tolerant and "ethnic mosaic" approach to multiculturalism,
whether originating from religious or ethnic components, by way of
difference from the "melting pot" approach sometimes proclaimed as
descriptive of the United States. The distinction in approach from the
United States is consistent with the Canadian reality of foundation on
English- and French- speaking societies, neither of which was prepared
to "melt" into the other.
To Prof. Baines, however, it is doubtful whether the constitutional
guarantees proclaimed in the recently adopted Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Charter) have truly been made available to
women. The Charter expressly codifies two sex equality provisions,
namely, Section 15 which provides general equality protection and
23. Judgment of January 16, 1998, E: 1997/1 (Siyasi PartiKapatma), K: 1998/1,
Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court] (Turkey).
24. By virtue of its lack of constitutional status, Canada's 1960 statutory Bill of
Rights offered limited protection of the rights that it purported to guarantee.
25. See Section 27 ("Multicultural heritage") of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which provides: "[t]his Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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Section 28 which provides specific gender equality protection.26 In
litigation, however, women have relied more on the former provision
(principle of equality) than the latter. Prof. Baines surveys recent cases
decided by Canadian courts presenting conflict between religious
freedom and sex equality, with specific references to the prohibition of
polygamy, the ban on faith-based family arbitration tribunals and the
Within this
limit on the accommodation of cultural differences.
landscape, and building on her own theoretical framework, Prof. Baines
identifies women seeking protection in religious and social contexts as
either religious or secular feminists, according to the priority they give,
respectively, to religious freedom over sex equality or to sex equality
over religious freedom. Women falling into these two categories can
invoke provisions of the Canadian Charter to find protection against
discrimination and, however imperfectly, have access to courts. In Prof.
Baines' view, however, the two categories of religious and secular
feminists do not exhaust the spectrum of women in need of protection.
Indeed, in the cases examined that present issues of polygamy, faithbased family arbitrations and accommodation of cultural differences,
religion and equality are represented in a mutually exclusive relationship,
and protection of equality is sought at the expenses of religious freedom
and vice versa.
Other feminists, however, put forth different claims, seeking at the
same time religious freedom and equality. Refusing to define them as
"multicultural feminists," Prof. Baines prefers to underline the missing
narrative of these feminists and their de facto intersectionalism, calling
them "intersectional feminists." Prof. Baines' main goal, here, is to
assess whether these intersectional feminists can and should have access
to the promise of constitutionalism and the protection it guarantees.
After providing an account of responses developed by Professors Moller
Okin,27 Volpp 28 and Sunder29 to intersectionalism issues, Prof. Baines
26. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms proclaims the
principle of equality:
(1) [e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or economic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Section 28 provides: "[n]otwithstanding anything in this Charter,the rights and freedoms
referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
27. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is
MuLTIcuLTuRALIsM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7-24 (Joshua Cohen, Michael Howard, Martha
Nussbaum eds., 1999).
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argues that, while these responses can work to accommodate concerns of
multiculturalism, they cannot satisfactorily address intersectionalist
claims. Her conclusion therefore is that constitutionalism, due to the
impermeability of its normative and strategic barriers, does not serve
intersectional feminists.
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND DEMOCRACY

The ConstitutionalRole of TransnationalCourts: PrincipledLegal
Ideas in Three-DimensionalPoliticalSpace
Kim Lane Scheppele
In her article on The ConstitutionalRole of TransnationalCourts:
Principled Legal Ideas in Three-Dimensional Political Space," Kim
Lane Scheppele analyzes the relationship between transnational and
domestic courts in the context of the global anti-terrorism campaign
started after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. Her title's
reference to three-dimensional space is a metaphor to facilitate
consideration of the "vertical" relationships among transnational,
national and, possibly, sub-national bodies and the "horizontal"
relationships among courts and institutions. Prof. Scheppele identifies
transnational and national courts as important institutional actors of
transnational constitutionalism, that exist not only in a hierarchical
relationship with each other. Indeed, not only do they reinforce each
other's ideas, they also increase the commitment to constitutionalism
using principled legal ideas to counter political action inconsistent with
such principled legal ideas. In the three-dimensional space, pressures for
lawmaking and for normative control over this lawmaking come from
different levels of actors. In some cases national laws are required to
implement international or regional mandates; in others, transnational
law develops as a consequence of the parallel action of multiple national
legislatures. These two kinds of pressures (top down-transnational to
national, and bottom up-national to transnational) result in intertwined
law adopted at different levels. The existence of the different levels also
results in overlapping jurisdictions of courts established at both national
Indeed, matters involving national and
and supranational levels.
supranational law can be adjudicated in both transnational and national
courts sharing a common commitment to methods and values.

28. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1181
(2001).
29. Madhavi Sunder, Piercingthe Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
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Analyzing these relationships in the context of the anti-terrorism
campaigns launched following September 11, 2001, Prof. Scheppele
notes the high number of binding transnational resolutions and of other
legal pronouncements addressed to the national level, as to which
national governments have generally been responsive in undertaking to
implement them through national law. She notes that the influence also
works in the opposite sense, with national governments pressing
transnational bodies to require consistent response from all member
states.
The extensive legal measures in the anti-terrorism field have
generated numerous constitutional challenges around the world. Courts
of various countries have found anti-terrorism measures adopted
following September 11, 2001, to be unconstitutional, at least in part.
Prof. Scheppele views such judgments as operating in a space occupied
by other judicial bodies and by national as well as transnational law.
Accordingly, Prof. Scheppele emphasizes the increasing overlap of
national and transnational law and judicial pronouncements.
Transnational courts might once have been seen primarily as issuing
decisions providing principled bases for the judgments of other political
bodies, including transnational institutions, national governments and
national high courts. Moreover, national courts have enlarged their
sphere of action, being increasingly called upon to rule on matters having
implications that extend beyond national borders. The growing body of
law relative to anti-terrorism initiatives and constitutional values is thus
in Prof. Scheppele's view best seen with a three dimensional perspective
on the interactions of levels of government and of their courts and other
institutions.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

DistributiveJustice-Poverty and Economic Development
V.S. Elizabeth
Poverty and ConstitutionalRights
M6nica Pinto
Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights under a Transformative
Constitution
Linda Stewart
V.S. Elizabeth, in Distributive Justice-Poverty And Economic
Development reviews aspects of Indian constitutional law that Prof.
Elizabeth identifies as critical to India's achievements to date in lifting

2010]

INTRODUCTION

significant parts of its population out of the legacy of poverty that
persisted following the British colonial period in India. The paper
addresses provisions of the Indian Constitution and decisions of India's
Supreme Court to highlight the key role of intervention by India's
governmental authorities in building a "mixed" economy.
Prof.
Elizabeth argues that absent the constitutional foundation for such
intervention, India would not have made the progress achieved to date.
Prof. Elizabeth underlines the need for an implementation of the
constitutional principles that the constituent assembly included in India's
1950 constitution. 30 One of the world's longest, 3 1 the constitution of
India was adopted January 26, 1950 and stands out for its ambitious
programmatic character, aiming to establish, as envisioned in its
Preamble, a society based on justice, freedom, equality and fraternity. Its
forty-second amendment, adopted in 1976, significantly modified the
text of the Preamble, introducing the aspiration to constitute India as a
socialist and lay democratic republic.32 This amendment, however, has
not led to the establishment of a full-fledged socialist state, but has rather
enhanced India's character as a state based on the principle of social
justice.
The constitution also includes what has been consistently defined as
a "trilogy" of aspirational principles and the "bedrock of the Indian
Constitution" 33 in its Parts addressing "Fundamental Rights" (FR, Part
30. The Constitution of India was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on
November 26, 1949, and came into effect on January 26, 1950.
31. The Indian Constitution consists of a Preamble, three hundred and ninety-five
articles divided in twenty parts and twelve schedules. It has been amended ninety-four
times, most recently in 2006.
32. Constitution of India (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 2, which
changed the former qualification of India as a "Sovereign Democratic Republic" to one
aiming to the establishment of a "Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic."
The change is particularly significant since the Supreme Court of India, in one of its most
famous decisions, determined that the Preamble can be invoked like any other provision
in the constitution for direct application in litigation and that any change to it may be
challenged on the ground of violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The
decision at issue, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1461,
established the power of the Indian judiciary to judge constitutionality of constitutional
amendments and declared unconstitutional a 1976 constitutional amendment adopted to
curtail protection of the previously constitutionally established right to property in order
to pursue land reform and redistribution of large landholdings to cultivators, and to
overrule previous decisions of the judiciary suggesting that the fight to property could not
be restricted.
33. See Mahendra Singh, Surya Deva, The Constitution of India: Symbol of Unity in
Diversity, in 53 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART, YEARBOOK OF

PUBLIc LAW (GERMANY) 649, 652 (2005), where the authors explain that these Parts of
the constitution are considered a "trilogy" because "together they constitute the vision of
a particular society which the Constitution envisage for India; a society which affords
opportunity to all its people for an all-round development, and in which citizens bear the
responsibility towards nation and society as such" (emphasis in the original).
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III), "Directive Principles of State Policy" (DPSP, Part IV) and
"Fundamental Duties" (Part IV A, introduced in its entirety by the fortysecond amendment).34 It is with specific regard to the Fundamental
Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy that Prof. Elizabeth
furthers the analysis on poverty and economic development in India,
taking into account significant decisions of the Supreme Court of India.
While the Fundamental Rights (listing mostly civil and political
rights) are considered justiciable by the constitution, the constitutional
text expressly excludes the justiciability of the Directive Principles of
State Policy. Constitution articles 36-51 define the Directive Principles
of State Policy and include among them various social rights such as the
rights to work, education, public assistance, living wages, and a
guaranteed minimum
standard of living, among
others. "
Notwithstanding that the constitution explicitly states that these rights are
not enforceable in court and were accordingly merely programmatic
provisions,3 6 the Supreme Court of India has qualified them as
inalienable human rights. 37
Prof. Elizabeth offers the conclusion that portions of the Indian
Constitution, namely its Preamble, Part III on Fundamental Rights and
Part IV on the Directive Principles of State Policy, taken together and
considered as instructions, to the legislative and executive powers,
established the legal basis for actions taken by the Indian government to
fight poverty, such as the Twenty Point Programme and the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.
M6nica Pinto's article on Poverty and Constitutional Rights,
focuses on the interrelation between democracy, human rights, poverty
and dignity, and on efforts made through international documents and
constitutions to guarantee basic fundamental rights to subjects facing
extreme deprivation. Since the 1990s, the international community has
increasingly addressed the relationship between poverty and human
rights. In 1996 the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights defined poverty as a "denial of human rights" and a

34. Constitution of India (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 11.
35. The Forty-second amendment also added several articles of this Part: Articles 39
A (equal justice and free legal aid), 43 A (participation of workers in the management of
industries) and 48 A (protection for environment).
36. Art. 37 of the constitution states: "[t]he provisions contained in this Part shall not
be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply
these principles in making laws."
37. Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, AIR 1997 SC 645:
(1997) 9 SCC 377: 1997 Lab IC 365 paragraph 38.
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38
condition in which the "basic capability to live in dignity was lacking.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1999 defined poverty as a
"deprivation of the right to live with dignity. 3 9 Most recently, in 2000
the Human Development Report defined poverty as an "infringement on
freedom" and qualified efforts to fight it as basic entitlements and human
rights.40
According to Prof. Pinto, democracy represents the ideal context for
the development and enjoyment of human rights, in which everyone is
entitled to the establishment of a social and international order where
human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully guaranteed.
Democratic states are obliged to ensure the enjoyment of human rights to
every citizen. Among the factors hindering a full enjoyment of human,
civil and political rights, poverty represents a most serious threat,
because people lacking material, educational and spiritual resources are
socially excluded, marginalized and de facto barred from the enjoyment
of citizenship's rights.
In fighting poverty, Prof. Pinto favors
abandonment of an assistance approach. She advocates its replacement
with a rights perspective in which citizens are considered rights-holders,
legitimated to claim action on the part of the State to address situations
of deprivation. Moreover, in Prof. Pinto's view, poverty should be dealt
with through strict enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights
not just in courts, but first and foremost through the action of the public
authorities.
Almost all Latin American countries are parties to the International
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and fourteen are also
parties to analogous regional instruments. Prof. Pinto notes, however,
that the mere ratification of treaties is not sufficient to effectively protect
human rights against poverty. Whether by express recognition in the
constitution of the constitutional or infra-constitutional status 4 1 of
international treaties (Paraguay and Argentina), or by establishment of
the rule that international treaties ratified by the country take precedence
over national legislation (Peru, Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia), most
Latin American constitutions converge towards recognition to human

38. See U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts. [CESCR], Poverty and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 4, § 1,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (Dec. 16 1996).
39. Villagrdn-Moraleset al. v. Guatemala, 1999 INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) no. 63,
§ 4 (Nov. 19, 1999) (Trinidad & Burelli, JJ., concurring).
40. U.N. Development Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report 2000, at
61-63 (Comms. Dev. Inc. ed., Global Rep. 2000) (prepared by Philip Alston et al.),
availableat http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf.
41. What is meant here, is that in these constitutional systems international treaties
have supremacy over legislative materials but remain subordinate to the constitution itself
in the hierarchy of sources of law.
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rights treaties of overriding rank in the hierarchy of sources of law.
Brazil's constitution goes as far as to expressly establish the "prevalence
of human rights" as a principle guiding Brazil's international relations
and express Brazil's commitment to international protection of human
rights. However, Prof. Pinto advocates the need for provisions of treaties
to be translated into concrete governmental measures and policies to
promote respect and development of human rights. Prof. Pinto concludes
that this is the only way to fight poverty effectively, guarantee enjoyment
of civil and political rights, and ultimately strengthen democracy.
In her article on Adjudicating Socio-economic Rights under a
Transformative Constitution, Linda Stewart provides an account of the
rights
Court's
socio-economic
South African Constitutional
jurisprudence. The Preamble to the 1996 Constitution expressly states
that its adoption is meant to "heal the divisions of the past and establish a
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental
human rights," and to "improve the quality of life of all citizens and free
the potentials of each person." In this context, Prof. Stewart carries out
an analysis of the Constitutional Court's leading decisions that interpret
the social rights' provisions of the Constitution. In the first part of the
article, she outlines three cases that shaped the Constitution Court's
42
general approach to social rights adjudication: (i) the 2000 Grootboom
decision in which the Court affirmed justiciability of socio-economic
rights; (ii) the 2002 Treatment Action Campaign case,43 in which the
Court established its competence to review adequacy of the State's
implementation of social rights in view of the obligation of the public
powers to respect, protect, promote and fulfill such rights; and, (iii) the
2004 Khosa case, 44 interpreting the text of the Constitution in an
universalist way to include permanent, but non-citizen residents in the
benefits provided by the welfare system. While the outcome of the cases
has widely been welcomed and the Court has been praised for its
context-sensitive approach to the transformative potential of socioeconomic rights jurisprudence, the Court's refusal to provide normative
clarity to the content of various socio-economic rights has been
criticized. In these cases the Court indeed avoided providing an
invariable universal standard, instead moving immediately to review the
effectiveness of the State's implementation of the rights and its
reasonableness. In Prof. Stewart's view, the Court's application of this
42. Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and
Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 CC; TAC 2002 (5) SA 72 CC (S. Afr.).
43. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002
(5) SA 72 (CC).
44. Khosa & Others v. Minister of Social Development & Others, 2004 (6) BCLR
569 CC (S. Aft.).
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reasonableness test, evaluating State action for simple compliance with
general good governance principles, does not succeed in avoiding the
court's injection of itself into separation of powers principles. Rather,
the Court' application of its reasonableness test amounts to adoption of a
formal, abstract and procedural approach to evaluation of action (or
inaction) taken by the State.
The article then presents recent litigation concerning the right of
access to sufficient water pursuant to the Constitution's Section 27.
The Mazibuko46 cases exemplify the varied approaches of the High
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. The
two lower courts showed a willingness to provide normative content to
the right at issue before moving to apply the reasonableness test and
determining a specific amount of water to be guaranteed by the State.
However, the Constitutional Court once again avoided establishing a
universal standard, instead adopting a more positivistic approach
focusing on the literal meaning of Constitution Section 27. In so doing,
according to Prof. Stewart, the Court abandons the contextual, purposive
and generous constitutional interpretation prescribed by Constitution
Section 39,47 disregarding the opportunity for a thorough analysis of
international and foreign law.
Prof. Stewart concludes that the
Constitutional Court seems to overlook that although it is the primary
role of the legislature and executive to implement socio-economic rights,
courts are vested with a quasi law-making role allowing them to translate
constitutional rights into enforceable legal claims.
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE POWERS

The Executive and the Courts
Richard Clayton

45. Section 27 ("Health care, food, water and social security") states: "Everyone has
the right to have access to... (b) sufficient food and water."
46. Mazibuko & Others v. The City of Johannesburg & Others, Case CCT 39/09
2009 ZACC 28 (S. Afr.).
47. Section 39 of the 1996 South African Constitution ("Interpretation of the Bill of
Rights") provides: (1)"[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society, based on
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may
consider foreign law. (2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. (3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the
existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or conferred by common
law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill of
Rights." S. AFR. CONST. 1996 Sec. 39.
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Richard Clayton in his article on The Executive and the Courts
analyzes the relationship between the executive power and courts in the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom does not have a written
constitution. In a constitutional system characterized by the absence of a
written constitution (understood as a foundational charter embodied in
one single written document), the relationship between the executive
power and the courts is not regulated by a formal constitutional
framework, but rather is the result of rules developed through history and
through patterns of conduct considered binding by the political actors
involved but not enforceable in courts.4 8
The adoption in 1998 of the Human Rights Act ("HRA"), which
entered into force in October 2000, altered the premise of parliamentary
sovereignty on which the United Kingdom's constitutional framework
had previously been based. 4 9 The HRA incorporated the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") into the English legal system.5 °
While prior to the adoption of the HRA the ECHR enjoyed the status of
an international treaty, the HRA rendered it domestic law of
constitutional significance. The rights established in the Convention are
thus equivalent to a national bill of rights, mandating that public
authorities comply with it. 51 Moreover, as Prof. Clayton underlines, the
adoption of the HRA means that should a public authority interfere with
a covered right (e.g. freedom of expression), the authority must
demonstrate that the interference is "prescribed by law" and
"proportionate." The HRA vests courts primarily with a power to read
"primary legislation and subordinate legislation [... ] in a way that is
compatible with Convention rights," conferring a "conformative"
interpretative power to judges. The conferral marks a significant shift of
power from Parliament to the judiciary. Although courts are not given

48. The often-cited definition of behavioral conventions defining a constitution
(termed "constitutional conventions" in countries influenced by the British system of
government) comes from Albert Venn Dicey. He maintained that British political actors
and institutions were bound by two sets of rules, the first being "laws" in the strict sense,
and the second defined as "conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which,
though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, of
the Ministry, or of other officials," are not "laws" and hence not enforceable by courts.
Albert Venn Dicey, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
23-24 (10h ed., 1959).
49. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (UK).
50. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as
amended by Protocol no. 11, 155 E.T.S. (1994) (effective Nov. 1, 1998) available at
http://conventions.coe.int.
51. Peter Leyland, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 64 (2007).
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the power to invalidate legislation,52 they are vested with the power to
exercise supervisory jurisdiction over decisions of the executive power.
This is a significant judicial power, although an outright declaration of
incompatibility of a law with the Convention merely prompts referral of
the question to Parliament, which is supposed to take active steps to
amend the legislation at issue. Section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act
provides that until the legislation is amended, a public authority may
nonetheless act in a way incompatible with the Convention.
Within this new constitutional landscape, Prof. Clayton's article
focuses on the extent to which executive decisions, at both central and
local level, are regulated by law and the degree to which courts can
scrutinize such decisions when deciding the merits of a specific case.
Prof. Clayton addresses the applicability and theoretical foundation of
the ultra vires principle as applied to local governments (i.e. decisions
issued by a local authority which are not based on a statutory power and
therefore considered ultra vires because the authority has acted without
jurisdiction to do so) and relevant decisions applying this principle. Prof.
Clayton then provides a detailed account of the proper approach to a
merits challenge in an administrative law case and the necessary
application of the so-called Wednesbury rationality test, which, on the
basis of the principle of separation of powers, justifies adoption by the
courts of a highly deferential approach in evaluating executive actions.
After explaining the process of application of the Wednesbury test, Prof.
Clayton also gives an account of the recent criticism developed against
application of the test and of advocacy of its replacement with a
structured proportionality test.
LEGAL

EDUCATION

Comparative ConstitutionalLaw in the Classroom: A South African
Perspective
Henk Botha
Teaching ConstitutionalLaw in Malaysia: The Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia'sExperience
Faridah Jalil, Che Norlia Mustafa
In his article, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw in the Classroom: A
South African Perspective, Henk Botha considers several means of
52. Section 4 of the Human Rights Act provides that when a judge cannot interpret
legislation in a way that would make it compatible with the Convention, the judge can
issue a declaration of incompatibility, which cannot "affect the validity, continuing
operation or enforcement" of the legislation.
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integrating foreign constitutional law into the curricula of South Africa's
law schools, that surprisingly persist in a traditional approach of
overlooking it. The omission is surprising because of comparative law's
fundamental role in the jurisprudence of South Africa's Constitutional
Court and that institution's key contribution to the foundation of South
Africa's post-apartheid regime, as well as the South African
constitution's direction to all judges to consider international law in the
interpretation of the constitution's bill of rights and its permission that
they do likewise as to foreign law. Notwithstanding these prominent
openings of the South African legal system to comparative constitutional
law, Prof. Botha reports that the nation's typical law school curricula
offer few opportunities to study foreign public law.
Professor Botha offers several explanations for the relative lack of
inclusion of comparative constitutional law in South African legal
education. He identifies one source as the inertia of a focus on private
law continuing from the period of apartheid when the perceived
neutrality of private law led many to focus on it as a refuge from the
manipulation of South African public law at the time. A further
explanation is the recent establishment of legal education as a four-year,
first university degree, thereby impeding the more advanced study
possible when legal study was achieved through an advanced degree. An
additional factor that he identifies is the development of approximately
fifteen years of specifically South African jurisprudence of depth
sufficient that many lawyers and judges focus on it to the exclusion of
other sources of law.
Prof. Botha identifies aspects of South African constitutional law
that cannot be easily appreciated without reference to foreign law, such
as English parliamentary and American presidential governance, German
federalism, and Canadian, European and United States' approaches to
human rights to appreciate respectively, South African parliamentary
presidentialism, federalism, and protection of human rights. Further, he
notes that studying various foreign models can stimulate students to
contemplate the contingency of their own system and the prospect of
alternative solutions. In addition, he observes the utility of reference to
foreign models in reconciling the tensions inherent in recognition of the
plural natures of South African society.
As a short cut to achieving the benefits of comparative
constitutional study, Prof. Botha points to the possibility of reading
various decisions of South Africa's constitutional court that delve into
foreign constitutional law and employ it to decide South African disputes
and to shape the ongoing constitutional debates.
As the new
constitutional order in South Africa "embraces plurality and
institutionalizes dissent by committing itself to a variety of often
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conflicting ideals," Prof. Botha asserts that the teaching of comparative
constitutional law helps future practitioners accept the existence of
plurality and dissent.
Faridah Jalil and Che Norlia Mustafa's article on Teaching
ConstitutionalLaw In Malaysia: The UniversitiKebangsaan Malaysia's
Experience provides an account of how the teaching of constitutional law
is affected by the unique character of Malaysian society. Addressing
both undergraduate and postgraduate studies offered at the Law School,
the two professors underline the differences in both methodology and
topics addressed at these two different levels of study.
Professors Jalil and Mustafa note that students find constitutional
law engaging for its connection to history, politics, economics and other
However, in studying the 1957 Constitution of
social sciences.
Malaysia-heavily amended since its enactment, they note a need of
students to overcome a tendency to seek a simple "right answer"
approach. The challenge of the instructor is to teach the students
continuously to refer to and rely on case law, judicial interpretation and
legal history to grasp the meaning of general and indeterminate
constitutional provisions and identify the original intention of the
Framers and assess how contemporary interpretation may differ.
Enrollment in undergraduate studies, after completion of secondary
education, brings to class all the richness and complexities of the
Students come from different
multifaceted Malaysian society.
educational, residential and social settings, and contribute with their
diverse personal experiences and approaches to life. In teaching a
subject which requires understanding and balancing of the values and
principles entrenched in the Constitution, students are challenged to
move beyond their subjective backgrounds to endorse diversity and a
more critical approach to the subject. Topics like the rule of law,
constitutional interpretation, human rights and independence of the
judiciary make the students' different backgrounds emerge out of
discussion in class. Teaching has recently moved towards a more
student-centered, problem-based approach. Comparative elements are
usually employed to better understand topics as constitutional supremacy
and separation of powers. The United Kingdom is a preferred object of
study for the purpose of understanding the Westminster system of
government as applied to the Malaysian context.
Educational programs for postgraduate students feature, in contrast,
a more international background, with students coming from Indonesia,
the Middle East, Africa and China. Comparative law represents a
fundamental component of postgraduate studies in constitutional law,
Australia being the most referenced jurisdiction. Special attention is paid
to cornerstones of constitutional theory like the principle of equality,
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affirmative actions, freedom of speech and religion, constitutional
interpretation, independence of the judiciary and federalism.
Postgraduate students are significantly encouraged to develop a critical
approach to constitutional doctrines and decisions through interactive
seminars and presentations. The most daunting task, for postgraduate
students, is represented by understanding and acceptance of the Western
conception of rights and liberties, especially in light of the more culturaloriented Asian conception of rights.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The diversity and breadth of the thirteen works here contributed will
provide insight not readily available in the domestic constitutional law
literature. We invite a detailed and careful reading of these symposium
papers, confident that they will reward the reader with new insights and
provoke further reflection and debate.

